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Much has been published since Cutro’s Tecnica e vita (2004) first appeared. Her book, however, 
has enduring merits that make the French translation reviewed here quite valuable. Drawing on 
English, French, and Italian scholarship, it offers a thoroughgoing reading of Foucault’s 
translations, interviews, and writings, in terms of the concept of life that he encountered in the 
“biological philosophy” of the 1950s. And it will be especially interesting to anyone concerned 
with his relation to three of its proponents: Georges Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer, and Viktor 
von Weizsäcker. 
 Life and technique are intimately connected. For Cutro, Foucault was always interested in 
political life and its conditions of possibility, matters of technical manipulation and assembly that 
make certain forms of political life possible while simultaneously defining them in their 
governability. Technique, in Cutro’s reading, is, therefore, “the key to how one elaborates the 
history of the present [actuel], to how one is governed via the truth, to how one can structure a 
constitutive relation with oneself” (7). Thus she aims to elucidate the articulation of technique and 
life in his work in order, “to clarify the way in which Foucault had the intuition that biological life 
had become a present [actuel] political problem” (8). She thereby offers a novel and convincing 
way to read Foucault’s oeuvre. Though it sometimes moves a bit quickly—something that cannot 
be helped given the range of works discussed—her book is closely argued, well researched, 
stimulating, and offers many insights into the emergence, context, and implications of Foucault’s 
works. In situating his works in relation to the problems of biological philosophy, Cutro not only 
gives a convincing reading of the unity of Foucault’s writings, but also subtly moves attention 
away from Foucault himself and towards the shared objects, methods, and problems that he 
contributed to formulating and questioning. 
 Cutro’s book goes quite far in explaining the methods, concerns, and problems shared 
with Canguilhem that enabled Foucault to develop his own archeological and genealogical 
inquiries. And her presentation of their intellectual relation as an osmosis dependent upon shared 
membranes seems to offer a fruitful way into a philosophical history of their writings. But these 
membranes were not shared by them alone. There was a range of works in biological philosophy 
popular among students including Foucault in the 1950s, but Cutro restricts herself to discussing 
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Canguilhem, Weizsäcker, and Ruyer, perhaps because they share the closest connections to him. 
The book also finds space to offer illuminating discussions of various historical authors, such as 
Jeremy Bentham, and explain important connections to Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
 Cutro’s study is so dense that I am not able to discuss all of its claims. Before discussing a 
few in particular, an overview of the book’s basic moves might be helpful. It has three main parts: 
the first, “Form of Life,” explains archaeology in its relation to Canguilhem, Weizsäcker, and 
Ruyer; the second, “Bio-politics,“ is devoted to the genealogical analyses, especially in relation to 
Canguilhem’s work, and how these led from disciplinary power to analyses of biopolitics, 
governmentality, neoliberalism, and, eventually, Foucault’s interest in ethics; and the third, 
“Philosophy of Bios,” charts Foucault’s turn to ethics in Greek and Roman antiquity out of his 
interest in revolutionary political spirituality and Lacan’s ethics. Intriguingly, the turn to 
antiquity is portrayed as a return to the themes of biological philosophy. 
 In “Form of Life” Cutro shows the close connection between life and technique by 
introducing Canguilhem’s epistemological history as a form of Kantian critique, a revolutionary 
technique of thought [Denkart] that measures the possibilities and limits of reason. Of course, for 
Kant, critical thought’s revolution is modeled on the physical sciences. Canguilhem’s Denkart also 
aims to repeat the work of rationality in the sciences so as to grasp its possibilities and limits, but 
proceeds by writing histories that treat sciences as singular, veridical discourses marked by crises 
and obstacles, each thus having its own historical viscosity. The epistemological historian’s task is 
not to produce chronologies according to the standards of general history, but to bring forth the 
latent history of a science and its present [actuel] truth by “miming the scientist’s practice, the 
gestures that produce knowledge and the instruments that permit it to exist” (16). Cutro suggests, 
thereby, that Canguilhem is an epistemological historian, as opposed to a historical 
epistemologist, because he is interested in the life of the sciences and grasps this through the 
events that punctuate and make their history. The sciences are forms of life that need to be 
understood on their own terms. And Canguilhem’s scientific histories pursue a non-scientific 
understanding that contributes to the vitality of thought by questioning received scientific 
categories. As Cutro makes clear, one of the primary obstacles to the history of science for 
Canguilhem is the idea of the precursor, since the sciences are endeavors that undergo radical, 
historical revolutions such that no sovereign consciousness could persist in or direct them. This 
Denkart vitalizes thought, at least in part, by exorcising such consciousness from the history of 
science. 
 Foucault’s own archeological works, Cutro shows, draw on Canguilhem’s mimetic 
approach even while deploying it at the level of, and for the sake of, transforming general history. 
Archaeology, thus, repeats the statements of diverse epochs in order to identify the limits and 
possibilities for thought, that is, the episteme, and understand how diverse and divergent 
epistemological figures, sciences, and formalisms emerge from a common savoir. And these 
repetitions not only make the author of the archaeology withdraw as statements appear in their 
own relations, they also exorcise sovereign consciousness from the history of ideas. Archaeology 
too is, then, a Denkart that plots out different discursive regimes so as to better destabilize present 




regimes. For Cutro, the point here is not to show how much of Canguilhem was in Foucault, or 
vice versa, but to identify the membranes that allowed for the sharing of ideas, methods, and 
problems. As she explains it, epistemological history and archaeology are both techniques of 
thought developed around the problem of biological philosophy, namely, how to promote the 
freedom of the living in the face of scientific determinism. 
 This is also the context within which Cutro first discusses Weizsäcker, whose Gestaltkreis 
Foucault translated, and Ruyer, featured by Canguilhem in his “Note on the Situation of 
Biological Philosophy in France.”1 Canguilhem’s article offers a defense of biological philosophy, 
understood as “an exercise of thought that is concerned with the philosophical reach of the 
phenomena of life,” contrasting this with the philosophy of biology, which seeks only to clarify 
contemporary biological theories (46). His article calls, thus, for a new metaphysics and critical 
rationalism, in which, as Cutro writes, “the refusal of a complete resolution of life in the concept 
thus becomes a reclamation of the impossibility of objectifying the living” (47). Cutro finds a 
similar project in Weizsäcker’s biological anthropology, which treats the organism as a totality 
that structures the human in all its relations to the world. For him the organism precedes scientific 
understanding of cause and effect and is characterized by a kind of anti-mechanism and anti-logic 
that is not amenable to the physical sciences (49). Ruyer’s own variant of biological philosophy is 
discussed for its appeal to causal indeterminism in thinking individuality as a form of becoming. 
 But Cutro’s argument is not that Foucault is the inheritor of these intellectual ancestors. 
Rather, “during his formative years, these figures had a decisive importance, each in his fashion 
and in a precise domain” (54). Canguilhem offered his conceptualization of normality, 
Weizsäcker his Gestaltkreis, and Ruyer morphogenesis. Drawing on The Order of Things, she claims 
that they form the “positive unconscious” of Foucault’s own writings. It is worth recalling that 
Foucault described this as the set of rules for forming statements, shared across disciplines, but 
which exists at a level that eludes the consciousness of individual scientists.2 His archaeologies of 
the human sciences unconsciously undertake, Cutro can then claim, a parallel endeavor to 
biological philosophy, one that seeks to undo the epistemic order that treats man as a thoroughly 
determined subject (55). 
 Her account of Foucault’s genealogical works, and the genesis of his account of biopower, 
is fascinating, illuminating, and convincing. But perhaps Cutro’s best case for the biological 
philosophy as Foucault’s positive unconscious is made in her discussion of his last works. 
Canguilhem figures importantly in the account given here. First, his discussion of health as a 
spontaneous activity of the individual is compared to Foucault’s own early gestures in this 
direction and his return to this theme in The Use of Pleasures and The Hermeneutics of the Subject. 
Thus, Foucault’s discussion of philosophical therapeutics is presented as a continuation of a 
                                                 
1 Canguilhem, “Note sur la situation faite en France à la philosophie biologique,” Revue de métaphysique et de 
morale, vol. 52, no. 3/4 (July-October, 1947), 322–332.  
2 Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage 1994), xi. 
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biomedical theme, though with this difference: whereas Canguilhem presented health as the truth 
of the body, Foucault’s exploration of Stoicism allows him to understand health as an activity by 
which subjectivity is created. Yet, following Cutro, Canguilhem is not abandoned at this point, 
since Foucault’s later writings deploy his claim that life is always a form or mode of life. For 
Canguilhem, life is always a mode of life since living takes the form of an individuality that 
shapes its own milieu and is, in turn, shaped by its milieu. Indeed, this is a central theme in 
Foucault’s discussions of the Stoics, though, as Cutro has it, he pushes this double relation 
beyond that of the living individual and its milieu to focus on the subject and its world, 
expanding beyond a primarily natural relation to include a political one in which humans are 
recognized as sharing a world with each other (194). 
 Ruyer is invoked here again for his thoughts about morphogenesis and the liberty 
emerging in the open links of a biological indeterminism. Weizsäcker’s work appears perhaps 
even more important for Foucault’s discussion of Stoicism, since he portrays every biological act 
as the genesis of a present through a kind of revolution, that is, a transformative return to the self 
through otherness. For him, “the space of the [organism’s] decision becomes the meeting place 
between organism and milieu, whereas the time of the decision becomes a genesis of the present” 
(197). For Cutro, Foucault does not merely mimic Weizsäcker’s biological philosophy, but imports 
its very conceptuality into his analyses of Stoic ethics (198). She uses an image from astronomy to 
gloss Foucault’s account of the Stoic subject: a rotation of the self around itself, like a planet on its 
axis, even as the self revolves around the world, like the planet around its star. It is this 
movement that produces ethical form, which as a result is never a universal form, but always 
emergent in relation to its content. Subjectivity then is inherently fragile, involving the possible 
emergence of new forms, but never in a predictable manner. Rather, it is in the turn to the world 
that a present [actualité] is engendered with its own ethical demands. Thus, following Cutro, 
Foucault’s interest in l’actualité originates, not only in Kantian philosophy, but also in biological 
philosophy. Moreover, this philosophy shapes Foucault’s account of freedom, which is neither 
autonomy, the choice of a lifestyle, nor a technique. Rather, freedom is found in the choice to live, 
the decision to embrace the unpredictable but opportune moment and become subject to it (199). 
 Not the least of its merits, Technique et vie provokes a number of questions. First, I wonder 
if we can really maintain that the biological philosophy was part of Foucault’s positive 
unconscious. After all, he was well aware of its role in contemporary debates and attempted to 
distance himself from it. Following François Jacob, for example, Foucault suggested that the time 
for discussing life was over, that a vitalist metaphysics was no longer possible.3 The book also 
raises questions about what Foucault was doing in his late discussions of antiquity. Foucault had, 
at various moments, been inclined to contest a foundational role for biological philosophy in the 
formation of modern subjectivities. Could his last inquiries be, in part, yet another way to contest 
                                                 
3 Foucault, “Croître et Multiplier,” Le Monde, No. 8037 (November 15–16, 1970), reprinted in Foucault, Dits et 
Écrits I (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 967–972. 




the biological philosophy by showing the extent to which its own positive unconscious was 
formed in late antiquity? 
 I must also remark that the differences between Canguilhem and Foucault seem, at times, 
overly stated. If health is the truth of the body, for Canguilhem, he also described dissatisfaction, 
which includes awareness of health’s absence, in the face of biological errancy as the basis of 
subjectivity.4 It should also be remembered that the human sciences were not of interest to 
Foucault alone, that Canguilhem was, for instance, famous for his lecture, “What is Psychology?” 
in the 1950s. Finally, Canguilhem conceived of life as always going beyond itself, thus humans 
have a biological milieu, but also a world.5 Despite these concerns, Cutro’s Technique et Vie is a 
valuable addition to the literature, for both its reading of Foucault and the questions that it 
provokes. 
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4 Canguilhem, Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences (Paris: Vrin, 2002), 365. 
5 Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life (New York: Fordham, 2008), 118–120. 
